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A Capitalising Foreign Policy: Regulatory Geographies and 
Transnationalised State Projects 
 
Introduction 
The nature and character of foreign policy making has been changing and this is reflected in 
the commercialisation of foreign policy missions, instruments and discourses. Increasingly, 
economic tools are being used to achieve policy objectives and policies are being framed in the 
language of business and economics. For instance, strategic partnerships, a term reminiscent 
of business textbooks, have become ubiquitous, replacing the more traditional language of 
alliances, and Presidential and Prime Ministerial visits to foreign countries often involve large 
business delegations. Another case in point is the emergence of rival proposals for regional 
economic integration in Asia. In the past few years, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), 
Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and One Belt One Road (OBOR) 
initiatives ‘moved from being a sideline to the major rivalries and power dynamics in the region 
to being a central driver of them’ (Wesley, 2015: 481). While the TPP failed to win 
Congressional support in the United States and has been abandoned by the new Administration 
of Donald Trump, there is still a need to understand the emergence of these new types of foreign 
policy initiatives because, as we touch on in the concluding section of the paper, this will help 
elucidate why they succeed or fail.  
 
Dominant approaches in International Relations (IR) and International Political Economy 
(IPE), however, are limited in their analytical power because they usually make a distinction 
between politics and economics and prioritise one over the other rather than seeing them as 
mutually constitutive (Desai, 2015; Murphy and Tooze, 1991). Specifically, approaches to the 
analysis of foreign policy in IR focus on politics and states, while the discipline of IPE, despite 
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having been established to find a ‘middle ground between politics and economics’ (Strange, 
1970: 33) has been focussed on economics and the international system, with little attention 
paid to the economics-politics nexus in states’ foreign policies. This distinction between 
politics and economics is the outcome of the assumption that under capitalism, given the 
detachment of the process of production from the power of coercion, the political and the 
economic constitute separate spheres and possess distinctive logics. This separation, as Wood 
(1981: 67) has argued, reflected a ‘historical reality in capitalist society’ and gives rise to 
practices that ‘actually do divide the arenas of economic and political action, and actually do 
transform certain essential political issues – struggles over domination and exploitation that 
historically have been inextricably bound up with political power – into distinctively 
“economic” issues’.  Under the ‘real appearance’ of market equality and freedom in capitalism, 
however, lies a distinctly political set of economic relations. As Wood (1981: 67) notes, the 
task is to ‘decipher the real meaning of the “appearance”’, and this requires ‘not the 
reproduction but the critical elaboration of bourgeois categories’.  
 
The treatment of economics and politics as having an external rather than internal relation in 
IR and IPE reproduces the surface appearance of the separation of politics and economics. In 
contrast, we seek to explain the growing ‘economic’ focus of foreign policies by foregrounding 
the internal relation of politics and economics. In particular, we argue that the uneven and 
combined development of global capitalism restructures state forms and patterns of class 
relationships and that this process shapes foreign policy strategies. We use this framework to 
analyse the emergence of the TPP, RCEP and OBOR initiatives. These initiatives have been 
understood through the lens of ‘competitive regionalism’ (Wesley, 2015: 481). From a ‘realist’ 
position, Wesley argues, for instance, that the ‘entanglement of trade diplomacy in Asia’s 
strategic rivalries is ultimately driven by a long-term structural bifurcation between the region’s 
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economic and security structures’ due to the rise of China as an industrial power while the US 
remains the foremost security provider (2015: 481). The TPP is viewed, in this account, as an 
American bid to realign the region’s economic and security structures around the US while the 
RCEP for China ‘is a defensive measure against the TPP’ (Wesley, 2015: 488). Hence, in this 
argument, strategic imperatives related to the desire for political and economic dominance are 
driving competitive regionalism. A key difficulty with using this notion of competitive 
regionalism to explain schemes such as the TPP and RCEP is that the analysis elides the 
specifically capitalist global political economy in which such projects are advanced. As a 
result, this reading of the TPP and RCEP misses their major drivers, which are not simply 
related to China’s economic growth and power-seeking on the part of both China and the US, 
as realists would have it, but are the product of the contradictions of capitalist development in 
China and the US as these states seek to maintain levels of profitability and competitiveness 
within a global market. These contradictions need to be understood within a process of global 
capitalist expansion that has shaped ‘internal’ social relations of capital accumulation and given 
rise to what we term, ‘transnationalised state projects’ and their associated geoeconomic 
strategies.  
 
This paper analyses the social foundations of these new transnationalised state projects, which 
are closely connected to the uneven development of the global capitalist economy. In our 
framework, the state is understood as a condensation of social relations (Jessop, 2003; 
Poulantzas, 1978). In the contemporary period, however, we argue that these social relations 
are transnationalised. Our analysis of transnationalised state projects builds on Trotsky’s 
(2009) theory of ‘uneven and combined development’ (UCD) by drawing on Poulantzas’ 
(1978) notion of ‘internalised transformations’. Our Poulantzian-UCD framework allows us to 
bridge the theoretical divide between the politics-focussed IR literature on foreign policy, the 
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economics-focussed IPE literature and the spatial politics-focussed Political Geography 
literature. Trotsky’s theory of UCD holds that capitalist expansion proceeds unevenly and leads 
to various combinations of socio-political forms and classes. While Trotsky discussed socio-
political combinations across modes of production, namely capitalism and feudalism, as Rolf 
argues, ‘there seems little reason ... why this analysis cannot be extended to the contradictory 
effects of sociological amalgamation inside the capitalist mode of production but across 
variegations of it’ (2015: 145). Poulantzas’s (1978) notion of ‘internalised transformations’ 
complements UCD as it identifies a mechanism through which the transnational dimension of 
state-restructuring takes place as capitalist development proceeds in combined ways. 
Specifically, we use Poulantzas to suggest that the effects of the transnationalisation of capital 
and its reproduction are internalised within the state institutions via the transnationalisation of 
state projects. Poulantzas used the terms ‘internationalisation’ and ‘transnationalisation’ 
interchangeably. We, however, specifically adopt the term ‘transnationalised state project’ 
rather than the ‘internationalisation of the state’ or the ‘transnational state’ – which usually 
refer to the absorption or rescaling of national states into existing transnational regulatory 
frameworks – because it better captures the extra-territorial reach of domestic regulatory 
frameworks.  
 
Crucial to our argument, moreover, is that transnationalised state projects are now increasingly 
diverse and are giving rise to distinctive geoeconomic strategies such as the TPP, RCEP and 
OBOR. While the TPP reflected an attempt to create a new stage in the transnationalisation of 
American capital, the RCEP and OBOR reflects an emerging China-centred transnationalised 
state project. In demarcating ‘geopolitical’ from ‘geoeconomic’ strategies we seek to highlight 
how the apparent separation of politics and economics now extends beyond the national 
frontier of the state through the transnationalisation of state projects. Such strategies attempt to 
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overcome key problems of capitalist development in the US and China through the export of 
distinctive modes of regulatory governance that we call regulatory geographies.   
 
In the first part of the paper we illustrate how realist, liberal, constructivist and some Marxist 
approaches in IR and Political Geography perpetuate the ‘real appearance’ of the separation of 
politics and economics or otherwise seek to collapse the distinction between politics and 
economics, which elides its ‘real effects’. Both these approaches lead to an inability to 
appreciate the varied political and territorial dynamics of different capitalist states. We argue 
in the second part of the paper that our Poulantzian-UCD framework offers a way of 
conceptualising the role of the international in the transformation and restructuring of capitalist 
states and their constitutive social relations. In arguing this, we build on recent work on UCD 
in IR but we go beyond the ‘historical-sociological and macro-sociological bias’ (Bruff, 2012: 
179) of much of this literature (e.g. Rosenberg, 2006). Specifically, rather than treating UCD 
as the transhistorical social basis of the ‘international’, we argue that it needs to be given 
specific content and form within capitalism. From this perspective, it is capitalism that gives 
the ‘international’ its uneven and combined form (Bruff, 2012; Rioux, 2015). In the 
contemporary period, we argue that it is the transnationalisation of capitalist combinations that 
shape trajectories of capitalist transformation. Here the state is crucial in mediating and 
managing the extension of processes of UCD across national territorial boundaries via the 
transnationalisation of state projects. In the third part of the paper, we apply our Poulantzian-
UCD approach to an analysis of American and Chinese transnationalised state projects and the 





The Politics-Economics Problematic in the Analysis of Foreign Policy 
The crucial political dynamics of transnationalised state projects remain obscured by the 
methodological nationalism and statism of dominant approaches to analysing foreign policy. 
A characteristic feature of most realist, liberal, constructivist and some Marxist approaches in 
IR, IPE and Political Geography is the treatment of politics and economics as possessing 
distinctive logics. In realist approaches in IR, for instance, economic power in the form of 
attributes such as industrial capacity, natural endowments and population size, is generally 
treated as a component of a state’s overall power capabilities which can be used as a tool to 
influence other states and build military power to ensure survival in an anarchical international 
system (Gilpin, 1987; Krasner, 1978). Hence, a structural link between economics and security 
does not exist in these accounts, but may exist depending on the strategies adopted by state 
officials at particular junctures. For instance, Mastanduno’s (1998: 827) attempt to ascertain 
‘the extent to which economic policies are subordinated to and supportive of security concerns’ 
in American foreign policy found that dominance of international economic competition, 
multipolarity and a threatening strategic environment all result in a greater willingness to utilise 
economic statecraft for broader national security goals. Luttwak (1998: 125) provides a 
different realist conceptualisation of the economics-security nexus with his claim that with the 
waning of Cold War ideological conflict, ‘the methods of commerce are displacing military 
methods’ in inter-state competition. He characterises this as a shift from ‘geopolitics’ to 
‘geoeconomics’, which he defines as the ‘admixture of the logic of conflict with the methods 
of commerce’ (Luttwak, 1998: 125).  In liberal approaches, contrary to Luttwak, the methods 
of commerce, trade and economic integration can shape state behaviour such that states become 
more pacific as they imbibe the liberal norms that underpin free trade regimes and benefit from 
economic cooperation (Keohane and Nye, 1977).  
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Alternatively, critiquing both the realist ‘politics determines economics’ approach as well as 
the normative liberal ‘economics should determine politics’ approach, Moravcsik’s (1997: 
522-3) liberal preferences theory links economics and security through state-society relations 
which are shaped by, among other things, ‘economic assets and endowments’ and the ‘relative 
position of those assets and endowments in global markets’. ‘Conventional’ constructivist 
approaches, such as that of Wendt (1999), which argue that foreign policy interests emerge 
from state identities, are like liberal approaches in their emphasis on how economic policies 
and institutions can help socialise states into peaceful and cooperative relationships. ‘Critical’ 
constructivist approaches also view state identities as the basis of foreign policy interests but 
place greater emphasis on domestic processes and histories in the construction of these 
identities (e.g. Weldes, 1999). The focus on practices of representation in these approaches, 
however, has led to a neglect of the role of the socio-economic forces and interests in the 
formation of state identities (Chacko, 2016). Realist, liberal and constructivist approaches in 
IR are, therefore, underpinned by the analytical separation of politics and economics and fail 
to theorise how the international is constitutive of not just state strategies but of broader 
capitalist social relations.    
 
An emerging body of Marxist work in Political Geography, IPE and IR does theorise the 
relationship between inter-state relations and the capitalist global order but several of these 
approaches, like those above, suggest that an external relation exists between political and 
economic ‘logics’. Mercille’s ‘radical geopolitics’ (2008), for instance, draws on David 
Harvey’s (2003: 27) distinction between ‘territorial’ and ‘capitalist’ logics, the former driven 
by leaders’ desire to retain political power within a limited territory and the latter by capitalists’ 
territorially expansive quest for individual advantage. Mercille’s (2008) approach modifies 
Harvey’s concepts into geopolitical and geoeconomic logics of power, the former driven by 
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political factors (namely electoral imperatives and the need to maintain international 
credibility) that underpin foreign policy making and the latter by the political economy of 
capitalist expansion. In this approach, while geopolitical logics are important, it is 
geoeconomic logics that mostly drive foreign policy making (Mercille, 2008: 578). Similarly, 
and also drawing on Harvey, Callinicos (2010) posits the existence of capitalist and territorial 
logics of power that underpin what he terms ‘economic’ and ‘geopolitical’ competition, 
respectively. For both Callinicos and Mercille, these territorial and capitalist logics are viewed 
as separate and distinctive logics that can overlap or contradict one another. Hence, the two-
logics approach with its distinct territorial and capitalist logics and demarcation of state-
managers’ interests from capitalists’ interests perpetuates the ‘real appearance’ of the 
separation of politics and economics under capitalism and obscures the political dynamics of 
UCD and the transnationalised state projects it gives rise to. 
 
Others take issue with a two-logics approach and instead seek to erase the distinction 
altogether. Colaz and Pozo’s (2011: 213-215) ‘Marxist geopolitics’ collapses Harvey’s two 
logics on the grounds that ‘territory acquires a value that transcends the neat distinction 
between capitalist and territorial logics of power’. In this account, capitalists valorise territory 
as much as state managers and politicians because of the need for ‘social infrastructure’ and 
class privilege for the reproduction of capital. Likewise, Davidson (2010: 83) rejects the two-
logics approach, on the basis that ‘capitals can perform some of the functions of states and 
states can act as capital’, in favour of a ‘mediated totality’ approach in which the competitive 
accumulation that characterises capitalism also creates a competitive multi-state system. For 
Davidson (2010: 93), ‘[t]he trajectory of geo-economic competition ultimately ends in 
geopolitical rivalry’. This ‘single logic’ approach obscures the ‘real effects’ of the surface 
appearance of the separation of politics and economics’ and the ways in which distinctive forms 
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of UCD are crystallised within state structures through geoeconomic strategies such as 
regulatory geographies.  
 
A Poulantzian–UCD Framework 
Rather than either a ‘two logics’ or ‘single logic’ approach what is needed, then, is what 
Teschke and Lacher (2010) call a ‘multiple logics’ approach that focusses on historically 
situated actors, their ‘varying and fundamentally contested construction and implementation of 
strategies of territorialization and accumulation’ and the different patterns of capitalist 
geopolitical competition and cooperation that are subsequently produced (Teschke and Lacher, 
2010: 32).1 Here we follow Bruff (2012), Desai (2015) and Rolf (2015) to highlight the 
relevance of Trotsky’s theory of UCD for understanding contemporary international politics. 
In particular, this approach draws attention to capitalism’s ‘contradictions’, which are 
dialectically related to its unevenness and the sociological amalgamations that are produced by 
its expansiveness, as the major driver of the process of capitalist development (Desai, 2015: 
6). In Trotsky’s theory, moreover, UCD is the product of both the global spread of capitalism 
as well as the political mediation and management of the contradictions produced by this global 
expansion (Rolf, 2015). As such, capitalism’s contradictions are also ‘the source of tension 
between contrasting forms of accumulation within states, as well as between them’ (Rolf, 2015: 
115). Hence, for instance, capital’s tendency toward social and spatial concentration for greater 
profits and productivity (which leads to unevenness) is contradicted by capital’s tendency 
toward over-accumulation, the disruption caused by technological advancement and shifts in 
production and the emergence of liquid capital, all of which promotes capital mobility. This 
process is mediated by state actors through the adoption of strategies to deal with the political 
and economic problems that stem from these strategies of capital accumulation. These 
strategies can include imperialism for the pursuit of new markets; combined development 
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through sociological amalgamations to produce new state projects; and, what we term, the 
‘transnationalisation’ of state projects.  
 
Adopting this vantage enables us to conceptualise the ‘international’ as differences arising out 
of the variegated forms of capitalism produced by combined capitalist development. We argue 
that there are now a diverse range of transnational state projects that reflect the distinctive 
pathways through which particular capitalist interests have transnationalised. These 
‘transnationalised’ state projects consist of distinctive combinations of socio-political forms 
and lead to various geoeconomic strategies such as the TPP, OBOR and RCEP. Our analysis 
of these diverse state projects intersects with the varieties of capitalism literature (Thelen 
2014); however, we argue that varieties of capitalism have emerged out of process of UCD and 
these in turn have been the basis for the emergence of state projects that transnationalises 
varieties of capitalism. In this context, the ‘national focus’ of the varieties of capitalism 
literature becomes increasingly problematic because it is unable to theorise the internal 
connections between varieties of capitalism or the export of forms of capitalism through state 
projects. Similarly, our approach analyses the operation of UCD in spaces beyond national 
territorial containers in a diversity of geoeconomic and regulatory spaces.   
 
In analysing these transnationalised state projects, the mechanisms through which UCD 
operate consist of what Trotsky (2009: 2-4) termed the ‘whip of external necessity’, defined 
here as the pressures induced by inter-societal differences which produce variegated forms of 
capitalism, and, the ‘privilege of historical backwardness’, defined as the use of strategies and 
technologies from early industrialisers to ‘compress’ capitalist development in later 
industrializing states. Such UCD mechanisms are well covered in the literature but a crucial 
innovation in our approach is to identify a further mechanism that Poulantzas (1975: 72) 
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termed, ‘internalisation’ – the emergence of an ‘internal’ or ‘interior’ bourgeoisie that 
‘maintains its own economic foundation and base of capital accumulation both within its own 
social formation, and abroad’.  
 
We make a two-fold argument. First, we argue that transnationalised state projects emerge 
when the whip of external necessity or the outcomes conferred by the privilege of 
backwardness induce state managers to undertake processes of state restructuring that involve 
the transnationalisation of capital. This process of UCD produces an interior bourgeoisie that 
is linked to transnational, rather than just national, circuits of capital. The relation between the 
interior bourgeoisie and state managers works through various ‘subsidiary mechanisms’ 
(Block, 1987: 57), such as lobbies and party structures through which transnationalisation 
strategies can be articulated. Second, this process of transnationalisation is mediated by actors 
and class fractions within both the transnationalising state and the states that are the targets of 
transnationalisation. Specifically, transnationalised state projects can be resisted and contested 
by other fractions of capital and other social forces and may confront challenges from state 
institutions and policies that are legacies of past social compromises.  
 
Our argument differs from both two logic approaches outlined above, which suggest distinctive 
territorial or geopolitical and class dynamics, and the notion of a ‘transnational state’ in the 
work of those, such as Robinson (2004), who argue that an emerging transnational capitalist 
class forms the basis of the formation of a transnational state apparatus that bypasses the 
‘national state’. Building on these ideas, Harris (2009) has argued that there is an emerging 
transnational state capitalist fraction in China, Russia and the Gulf states that have both a 
common and joint project with other more market-oriented transnational capitalist class 
fractions. This conception, like Robinson’s transnational capitalist class thesis, remains 
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detached from the specific local processes of capitalist transformation that lead to the 
transnationalisation of capital, be it Gulf capital (Hanneh, 2011) or the Chinese state capital 
analysed in this paper.  In his discussion of the emergence of Gulf capitalism, for instance, 
Hanneh (2011) notes that what he describes as the internationalisation of capital emerged ‘in 
“hothouse” fashion - from state-supported and family-based trading groups in the 1960s and 
1970s to the domination of a few massive conglomerates in the contemporary period’ (Hanneh 
2011: 2). However, rather than confronting the state as an external actor, these transnational 
class fractions are involved in contestation over the establishment of hegemonic projects within 
states (Bieler and Morton, 2013). The implication of this argument, as Bieler and Morton 
(2013: 42) point out, is that the ‘historical dimension of the formation of specific forms of the 
state in their different ways needs to be taken into account when analysing the internal relations 
between the inter-state system and globalisation’. 
 
Drawing on Sparke and Lawson (2003) and Cowen and Smith’s (2009) notion of 
‘geoeconomics’ as a specific capitalist logic associated with market rationalities and 
transnationalised economies, this paper argues that American and Chinese plurilateral trade 
agreements and infrastructure building are different articulations of a geoeconomic strategy 
that we term regulatory geographies. We define regulatory geographies as varied forms of 
regulation across transnational, often regional, space that are both differentiated – in regulatory 
instruments, actors and processes – but at the same time linked by distinctive ‘conceptions of 
regulatory control’ that define key modes of regulatory coordination and governance.2 We 
adapt the notion of ‘conceptions of regulatory control’ from the Amsterdam School’s notion of 
‘comprehensive concepts of control’ which refers to the articulation of the interests of 
particular fractions of capital as the general interest through broad ranging projects such as the 
Keynesian welfare state (Van der Pijl, 1998). We adopt a narrower understanding of 
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‘conceptions of regulatory control’ to delineate competing forms of market coordination and 
regulation. These competing concepts of control embody the social logic of the dominant class 
coalitions that underpin the transnationalised state projects promoted by key capitalist 
economies. 
 
The other major feature of regulatory geographies is that they provide a form of what Harvey 
(2003) calls a ‘spatial fix’ to overcome fundamental contradiction and crisis tendencies in 
capital accumulation. Jessop (2006: 153, 163) has drawn attention to Harvey’s notion of 
‘structured coherence’ as bringing together productive forces and social relations within 
bounded regional spaces as a ‘spatio-temporal fix’ that ‘displaces and defers contradictions 
both within a given economic space and/or political territory and beyond it’. As Jessop (2006) 
notes, implicit in this discussion is the role of political institutions in producing such – albeit 
limited – structural coherence. Harvey tends to privilege the national frame when he uses this 
concept – but there is no inherent reason why in this framework cannot be applied to other 
scales. Indeed, in this paper, we argue that regulatory geographies seek to create forms of 
regulatory coherence – via conceptions of regulatory control – through transnational regulatory 
space. The advantage of this broader notion of regulation is that it includes more than juridical 
regulation and points to more deep-seated changes in modes of governance through 
transnationalising state projects.   
 
In the remainder of this paper we use this framework to understand the emergence of economic 
integration proposals that, for some time at least, became a central driver of security and power 
dynamics in the Asian region. We focus especially on the attempt to extend particular 
conceptions of regulatory control beyond territorial borders via the establishment of the 
regulatory geographies of the TPP, RCEP and OBOR. 
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The Regulatory Geography of the TPP: UCD and the Transnationalisation of the 
American State Project  
The TPP was the product of a particular American transnationalised state project that emerged 
under Barack Obama and aimed to create a regulatory geography underpinned by ‘liberal’ 
conceptions of regulatory control. This geoeconomic strategy sought to manage key 
contradictions in American capitalism while reproducing the surface appearance of the 
separation of politics and economics by presenting initiatives like the TPP as simply advancing 
markets and free trade while maintaining the US’s global dominance. As Obama’s Defense 
Secretary, Ash Carter noted: 
[P]assing TPP is as important to me as another aircraft carrier. It would deepen our alliances and 
partnerships abroad and underscore our lasting commitment to the Asia-Pacific. And it would help us 
promote a global order that reflects both our interests and our values (2015).  
 
While the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was an early exemplar of this 
form of transnationalised state project, the TPP aimed to deepen and consolidate a liberal 
regulatory regime in the Asian region. This transnational promotion of a liberal regulatory 
geography was a product of the interaction between different forms of combined capitalist 
development. Specifically, the sustained downturn in the manufacturing sector in the US since 
the 2000s is due, in particular, to the rise of China as a manufacturing power (David, Dorn and 
Hanson, 2013). The rise of ‘contender states’ (Van der Pijl, 1998) is a key outcome of UCD, 
as later industrialisers take advantage of the privilege of historical backwardness to combine 
or compress stages of capitalism to make rapid advances in economic growth by assimilating 
technology and knowledge from earlier industrialisers. The downturn in American 
manufacturing led to the loss of one-third of the American manufacturing workforce in the 
2000s. This decline was not due to increased manufacturing productivity but losses in real 
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value added output, including in advanced technology products, because of falling foreign 
competitiveness and, in particular, import competition from China (Nager and Atkinson, 2015). 
As Hart-Landsberg (2013) argues, trade imbalances between the US and China produced an 
arrangement where low-wage manufactured goods were exported to the US, leading to trade 
surpluses that were then invested in the US, particularly through the purchasing of debt issued 
by American financial institutions. Thus, Schwarz (2012: 107) points out that ‘up until about 
2005, the US and China had a symbiotic – indeed ‘co-dependent in the pop psychological sense 
– relationship with respect to growth and employment’. This relationship, in turn, however, 
fuelled the global financial crisis of 2008 as Chinese growth became more capital intensive, 
thereby eroding American competitiveness and jobs in technology manufacturing and driving 
down incomes. While the conditions for American manufacturing have improved and output 
and employment have been slowly growing since the end of the recession in 2009, as Nager 
and Atkinson (2015) argue, there is little evidence that this is due to a recovery of international 
competitiveness or that the manufacturing sector will be restored as a major force in the 
American economy.  
 
With manufacturing in decline and the ‘whip’ provided by the rise of China as a contender 
state, services, the ‘knowledge economy’ and associated industries, which have emerged in 
part because of technological changes, are increasingly being recognised by American political 
leaders as the central drivers of economic growth, as they attempt to mediate and manage the 
effects of UCD. These industries – such as pharmaceuticals and entertainment – have emerged 
as influential actors in the formulation of American trade policy (Sell, 2010b).  Yet, the 
American government has been unable to shape the rules related to intellectual property rights 
(IPR) in the ways desired by powerful domestic capitalist interests in these sectors, such as 
brand-name pharmaceutical companies and entertainment companies, in WTO processes. As 
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van Apeldoorn and de Graaff (2012) have shown, transnationally-oriented fractions of 
American capital have long exercised influence over state managers through institutional 
channels such as policy planning networks, business advocacy groups and personal ties with 
foreign policy officials.  In this case, these capitalist interests worked through their lobbies, 
such as the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers Association (PhRMA) and 
DisneyPAC, to advocate the adoption of a strategy of ‘vertical forum shifting’ (Sell, 2010a: 
450-4) to negotiate ‘WTO Plus’ treaties at the bilateral and regional level that go beyond 
traditional WTO trade liberalisation objectives and includes a whole host of regulatory and 
competitive barriers to trade and investment (Lim and Elms, 2012).  The TPP was the 
culmination of this strategy because it sought to give coherence to the ‘spaghetti bowl’ 
(Baldwin, 2008) of bilateral agreements that the US has negotiated with countries in the Asia-
Pacific region like Australia and Singapore while extending and deepening such regulatory 
rules through plurilateral arrangements – that is agreements with groups of countries. Important 
as these institutional rules may be, its crucial significance lay in the fact that they attempted to 
create new geographies of regulatory governance that embed particular modes of governance 
‘inside’ the regulatory architecture of signatory states. 
 
The extension of IPR for pharmaceutical products provides a striking example of the liberal 
conceptions of regulatory control that the TPP sought to embed in Asia. While the final text 
was much less onerous than the initial demands made by American negotiators, it still 
contained provisions for the expansion of property rights by 5-8 years while the investment 
chapter of the TPP placed limits on the ability of states to use compulsory licenses as a tool to 
negotiate prices for drugs (Shah, 2012).  Hence, the TPP was to potentially lead to changes to 
patent laws and to regulation that would have determined the cost of drugs, the availability of 
generics and the packaging of products such as Tobacco − all of which are crucial to public 
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health regulatory regimes as well (Rimmer, 2012; 2013). Likewise, a leaked letter by the Walt 
Disney Company’s Chief Executive Officer, Bob Iger, to employees laid out the entertainment 
industry’s efforts to export domestic regulatory rules into the TPP:  
We played a major role in ensuring that the "Trade Promotion Authority" legislation set high standards 
for intellectual property (IP) provisions in our trade negotiations, and we helped get that bill through 
Congress. We used that language in TPA to advocate successfully for a strong IP chapter in the Trans-
Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade negotiations. We also pushed for provisions to promote digital trade and 
to reduce barriers in media and entertainment sectors. TPP will establish a strong baseline of protection 
for intellectual property while breaking down trade barriers in the Asia Pacific region. In both TPA and 
TPP we had to overcome significant efforts to weaken respect for IP, pushed not only by foreign 
governments but also from within our own Congress and the Administration (Quoted in Mullin, 2016). 
 
The intent of these initiatives was to shape regulatory governance – particularly on issues of 
IPR – within the policy-making apparatus of other states. Here, the nature and form of this 
transnationalisation was driven by an effort to embed American intellectual property practices 
beyond its borders, creating – via plurilateral means – regulatory geographies of intellectual 
property. In this way, the US government, working on behalf of a particular transnational 
capitalist fraction or interior bourgeoisie, sought to secure its advantage in key areas of 
transnational service and knowledge industries in order to manage the economic impact of a 
contracting manufacturing sector. 
 
Yet, the rise of China as a contender state and the impact of this on eroding the industrial 
manufacturing sector was not the only way in which UCD has shaped US capitalist 
development. The growth in outsourcing in some sectors of the US economy from the 1970s 
and 1980s took advantage of the rapid growth of low-cost manufacturing and services in 
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contender states and led to combined forms of capitalism in the US. Panitch and Gindin (2012) 
point out, for instance, that American manufacturers increasingly  
outsourced many operations, now purchasing from other companies much of what they had previously 
performed “in house” (from accounting to janitorial services to a great deal of production itself). …The 
result was a more interdependent global capitalism that required more than ever the consolidation of 
“free trade” to facilitate borderless production (2012: 287).  
 
It was the very nature of this growing transnationalisation of trade that required more 
substantial regulatory governance of these production networks. Equally important here in the 
context of our argument is how these industries combine different forms of capitalism within 
these production networks. So, for example, an information technology company such as Apple 
combines its knowledge capitalism within a production network, through a company such as 
Foxconn in China, which relies on the highly intensive monitoring of workers in factories that 
resemble forms of Taylorism (Chan, Pun, and Selden, 2013). One of the major features of 
American capitalist development since the 1970s has been its distinctive combinations of these 
capitalist forms within global production networks. Such combinations have been an important 
driver in schemes like the TPP which sought to create new regulatory geographies around US-
based regulatory models based on specific liberal conceptions of regulatory control.   
 
Another significant dimension of the regulatory geography of the TPP was the attempt to 
impose a version of regulatory coherence onto the regional economic order. In this way, 
regulatory geographies go further than facilitating the transnationalisation of capital. Rather, at 
issue here is the distinctive way that the TPP set out specific mandates and missions around 
which regulatory coherence amongst signatory states would have been established (Bollyky, 
2012: 179). As we see in the IPR sections, it was less about specific regulations but rather the 
broader modes of regulation through which trade and markets are governed. In various areas, 
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the TPP allowed flexibility but this flexibility was bounded by conceptions of regulatory 
control that organise the regulatory landscape. The US Trade Representative, Michael Froman 
noted of the digital copyright provisions, which are designed to be akin to the domestic Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act, that it was meant to be less prescriptive than previous trade 
agreements (Johnson 2016). Rather the intent was to enable greater flexibility in rules to 
accommodate legal and institutional differences between countries but in way that 
operationalises the principle that regulatory systems need to effectively remove content that 
infringes intellectual property rights. 
 
 Plurilateral agreements are attempts to impose regulatory disciplines within various policy 
making and judicial institutions within states. In relation to the TPP, an important example of 
this regulatory disciplining was its inclusion of the Investor State Dispute Settlement (ISDS). 
In essence, the ISDS established an international arbitration forum to rule on potential 
infringements of ‘investor rights’ such as those through nationalisation or through various 
public policy initiatives such as public health laws. In effect, ISDS had the effect of protecting 
investor rights from policy and legislative restrictions across a wide range of public policy 
areas. At the same time, these arbitral processes bypass domestic judicial and legal institutions. 
The ISDS clauses have a long history and have been central to the attempts of the US to 
internationalise its own regulatory instruments and procedures. For example, Chapter 11 of the 
NAFTA established a framework for ISDS (Abbott, 2000) that was incorporated in the TPP. 
As Capling and Nossal (2006) argue, Chapter 11 of the NAFTA was unique in allowing an 
investor to bring claims against a state without relying on the support of another state to lodge 
a grievance. A key consequence of Chapter 11 was that it allowed private actors direct access 
to the dispute settlement process. More consequentially, Chapter 11 helped to create a 
transnational regulatory system that embedded particular conceptions of regulatory control in 
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domestic policy-making institutions. The American government has had a chequered history 
with ISDS clauses, particularly via the now failed multilateral investment regimes. Capling and 
Nossal (2006) argue that the political fallout from these various attempts at introducing ISDS 
may have led the US to abandon such initiatives. Yet, despite these failures, it persisted with 
the ISDS clause in the TPP and succeeded in incorporating the clause in the final text. While 
the ISDS clause had significant exclusions – including those over the contentious issue of 
tobacco control – it was a crucial pivotal component of the TPP. However, the incorporation 
of ISDS in the TPP – under an incumbent Democratic President with a substantial political 
constituency hostile to this clause in the US – suggests that the ISDS was seen by the Obama 
Administration as important instrument through which liberal regulatory disciplines could be 
internalised within the regulatory geography of the TPP.   
 
Another important dimension of the regulatory disciplining of the TPP was the inclusion of 
clauses on competition policy and the treatment of state-owned companies (SOEs) (Office of 
the United States Trade Representative, n.d.). The insertion of these clauses was clearly to 
support the development of the TPP as a tool with which to carry out regulatory disciplining, 
with a particular intent to shape and modify the behaviour of Chinese SOEs across the region. 
China was not a part of the TPP although it was invited to join negotiations by Hillary Clinton 
(2012) in 2012 as the talks were already underway. One of the key rationales for the TPP, and 
China’s late invitation, was that China’s neighbours and trading partners could be enmeshed 
within a set of US rules and norms with the expectation that, as Barack Obama put it in an 
interview, ‘then China is going to have to at least take those international norms into account’ 
and eventually undertake domestic reforms to meet the required labour, environment and 
intellectual property standards (Quoted in Wheaton, 2015). Hence, the clauses on competition 
and SOEs were designed to ensure that SOEs could be disciplined to be made compatible with 
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liberal conceptions of regulatory control. They do so, for example, by providing the basis for 
sanctions against ‘non-commercial’ activities to support SOEs, such as subsidies and low-cost 
financing. 
 
The Regulatory Geographies of RCEP and OBOR: UCD and the Transnationalisation of 
the Chinese State Project 
Capitalist development in China is inextricably tied to transformations in American capitalism. 
The intertwining of Chinese and American forms of combined capitalist development created 
the conditions for China’s rapid economic growth in the 1980s and 1990s (Hardy, 2016). 
Underpinning this boom was China’s integration into global production networks linking into 
American consumer markets. China’s expansion was a variant of the ‘embedded mercantilism’ 
that defined East Asian political economies of the 1970s (Jayasuriya, 2003). Similarly, China’s 
growth strategies are consistent with the notion of 'exportism' developed by Sum (Jessop and 
Sum, 2006: 161-165), who identifies a distinctive set of accumulation strategies – and related 
extra-economic practices – underpinned by export-driven growth and its associated articulation 
with the global division of labour. Especially important in this pattern of combined capitalist 
development was the continuing role of SOEs, which were shorn of their welfarist functions 
and strengthened by the emergence of a powerful state capitalist class with links in the party 
bureaucracy (Hung, 2015).3 Here the combination of previous legacies of socialist 
development – such as the role of SOEs – with programs of market reform has produced a 
distinctive form of capitalist development in which SOEs have become key market players in 
sectors such infrastructure, telecommunications and banking. In short, combined capitalist 
development has been shaped by China’s history of developmentalism and state control of the 
economy, configuring what McNally (2012) terms ‘hybrid forms of capitalism’, underpinned 
by ‘statist’ conceptions of regulatory control, in which SOEs and state regulatory agencies play 
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an important political and economic role in major industrial sectors.4  
 
In this context, an important subsidiary mechanism through which UCD operates is ‘a 
combination of institutional and affective ties that “thickly embed” them [SOEs and private 
capitalists] with the party-state’ (Ten Brink 2011: 19).  This underlines the key insight of our 
Poulantzian-UCD framework that combined capitalist development is a process that works 
through moulding the form as well as modes of contestation within state institutions, producing 
distinctive forms of transnationalised state projects. The social foundations of such projects are 
located in China’s pattern of combined capitalist development, that is, the emergence of what 
has been described as an investment-led accumulation regime (Vermeiren and Dierckx, 2012). 
This regime is characterised by both export dependency and high levels of investment. In a 
succinct analysis of this accumulation regime, Vermeiren and Dierckx (2012) argue that this is 
an investment-led regime with high levels of domestic investment, particularly by SOEs. They 
argue that the notion that China’s growth is overly dependent on foreign direct investment-led 
exports obscures the key function of domestic fixed-asset investment – by: 
SOEs in particular – in its overall accumulation dynamic. Investment in China, which is unusually high 
by most standards, has contributed over half of GDP growth on average over the past 10 years (5.25% 
points out of an average of 10%)’ (Vermeiren and Dierckx, 2012: 1654).  
This accumulation regime is dependent on a confluence of interests between transnational 
foreign investors and domestic state-owned capital. Hence, China’s distinctive processes of 
UCD have led to the internalisation of a distinctive set of social forces – foreign owned 
companies and state capitalists – within the state apparatus. 
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However, since the global financial crisis of 2008 which reduced global demand, this 
accumulation regime has been faced with domestic overcapacity, low profits and high levels 
of debt, which has led to a dependence on the export sector (Hung 2015: 15; Hardy, 2016; 
Hart-Landsberg, 2013). The problem of over-accumulation was reinforced by the credit boom 
in China – itself a result of trade surpluses – which boosted debt-financed investment in SOEs 
even further and added to the build-up of excess production capacity (Hung 2015). Such debt-
financed investment was crucial to state capitalists and their political allies to maintain social 
stability. Indeed, the push of investments to the interior regions in the west of China was both 
an attempt to create more profitable opportunities for SOEs and quell potential social instability 
resulting from uneven development. As Fan (1995: 425) has argued, China’s post-1978 
economic policy reforms emphasised comparative advantage, regional specialisation and 
division of labour, and a so-called ‘ladder-step’ approach whereby initial priority was given to 
economic growth in the coastal region which would then diffuse to inner regions. In the ‘three 
belts’ model, which became the basis for China’s regional development policy in the 1980s, 
the eastern region of China would drive economic growth through export-oriented industries 
and foreign trade, boosted by preferential policies. The central region would focus on 
agriculture and energy production while the western region focussed on animal husbandry and 
mining. Preferential policies toward the coastal regions resulted in the net transfer of resources 
and revenue from the interior provinces to the coastal provinces (Fan, 1995). The resulting 
inter-provincial developmental gaps and income inequalities and subsequent political 
dissatisfaction led to a shift in policy in the 2000s to emphasise the growth in the interior 
provinces through the expansion of international trade with these areas and the liberalisation 
of the national market (Fujita and Hu, 2001). For instance, the expansion of Foxconn – a 
company which as noted above is intertwined with American technology production networks 
– into China’s leading exporter has been facilitated, in part, by this shift of manufacturing from 
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coastal to interior provinces, due to lower wages in these areas and government incentives 
(Andrijasevic and Sacchetto, 2016). As Hardy (2016: 10) notes, ‘what emerges are complex 
patterns of capital mobility with firms moving from urban to suburban locations, from large to 
small cities, from the coastal regions to inland China and out of China completely’.  The point 
to underline here is that the contradictions arising out of processes of UCD in China were 
crystallised within state institutions and structures through the role of state capitalists and 
government interventions to maintain social stability. State initiatives to manage these tensions 
were crucial in accelerating the transnationalisation of state capital by moving production and 
investment to the interior regions and out of China altogether. 
 
The pressures that emerge from patterns of UCD in China are pivotal to understanding China’s 
backing for the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). The RCEP was first 
announced in Bali in 2011 at the ASEAN Leadership Summit.  It seeks to give regional 
coherence to the proliferating array of bilateral agreements around the region. At the diplomatic 
core of this agreement was the so-called notion of ASEAN centrality – the pivotal role of 
ASEAN in shaping the nature and form of this trade agreement. In relation to the TPP, the 
RCEP has often been seen as a ‘low quality’ agreement. However, this distinction between 
‘low and high’ quality masks a more fundamental divergence in the nature of regulatory 
coordination between the agreements. The TPP, as we have seen, had a strong focus on the 
enforcement of rules such as IPR that are crucial to service sector liberalisation. In contrast, 
the RCEP is much more concerned with the coordination of trade facilitation as an important 
element in giving coherence to the region’s supply chain of industrialisation. This facilitation 
– through regulatory coordination – is particularly important for the integration of regional 
production networks that lie at the heart of China’s export industrialisation. Such rules of 
facilitation form the basis of the distinctive conceptions of regulatory control with which China 
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seeks to mediate the contradictions arising from its uneven and combined capitalist 
development, such as overcapacity and export dependence.  
 
But trade facilitation is just one dimension of the proposed RCEP regulatory geography. An 
even more crucial aspect of the conceptions of regulatory control is to be found in the striking 
emphasis that RCEP places on accommodating different modalities of trade liberalisation.  In 
the case of China, trade liberalisation rests on the notion of ‘non-interference’ which, as 
Gonzalez argues,  
is a very particular norm of political and economic engagement, which is at odds with some other 
forms of supranational or regulatory regionalism that diffuse national state power or rescale it 
upwards or downwards away from the state. Instead, Chinese non-interference enhances 
bilateralism and state-based decision-making (2015: 207).  
Hence, the strategy of non-interference in a broad range of areas – such as development 
assistance or lending for infrastructure – leads to the consolidation of executive decision 
making and local business interests associated with the transnationalisation of capital. There is 
confluence here between forms of hybrid capitalism and its embeddedness within state-to-state 
bilateral agreements. In this way, our argument underlines how these ‘statist’ conceptions of 
regulatory control have been exported through the transnationalisation of state projects. 
Through non-interference, despite its more overtly political capitalism, the Chinese state can 
reproduce the real appearance of the distinction between economics and politics as it 
transnationalises by seemingly preserving government autonomy and control of the economy 
in target states. Regulatory coordination takes place, but the form and nature of that 
coordination is refracted through the diplomatic fiction of non-interference. An example of this 
is the bilateral embedding of infrastructure with neighbouring states. A case in point is China’s 
participation in the Greater Mekong Scheme (GMS), which was conditioned by the expansion 
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of Chinese state capital – both provincial and central – to the Mekong (Tubilewicz and 
Jayasuriya, 2015). Just as NAFTA was an early exemplar of the American transnationalised 
state project, the GMS was an earlier example of Chinese transnationalisation. Specifically, the 
GMS enabled the development of complex logistic chains and regulation through 
intergovernmental agreements for the facilitation of the expansion of state capital. However, 
the attraction of these agreements for neighbouring states lay ‘in their ostensibly non-political 
purpose and design’ which serves to reproduce the real appearance of the distinction between 
economic and politics (Tubilewicz and Jayasuriya, 2015: 200). Hence, the fiction of non-
interference is pivotal to the way Chinese modes of combined development are 
transnationalised. 
   
One effect of this mode of transnationalisation was the localisation and territorialisation of 
capital within specific geographical spaces. With regard to the GMS, the very terminology of 
‘transport corridors and logistical chains’ implied the importance of these new forms of 
territorialisation. In particular, the development of logistics, transport, infrastructure and even 
labour have become building blocks of an emerging regulatory geography which forms the 
basis of a range of Chinese-led regional and governance initiatives, such as the OBOR 
proposal. As with the GMS, OBOR seeks to create new spatial fixes around the regulatory 
coordination of transport and other infrastructure logistics. The OBOR geoeconomic strategy 
is the latest and most expansive attempt at mediating processes of UCD in China by linking 
under-developed inner regions to global markets. Indeed, Summers (2016) has argued that 
although it has been presented as a national vision, OBOR in fact originates in sub-national 
policy frameworks. As the official OBOR document states: 
In advancing the Belt and Road Initiative, China will fully leverage the comparative advantages of its 
various regions, adopt a proactive strategy of further opening-up, strengthen interaction and cooperation 
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among the eastern, western and central regions, and comprehensively improve the openness of the 
Chinese economy (National Development and Reform Commission, 2015)  
 
The OBOR strategy consists of two mutually reinforcing initiatives. One is a so-called Silk 
Road that seeks to expand existing incipient infrastructure linkages to connect Xian in Central 
China through Central Asia, linking up with the Trans-Siberian railway to Moscow and Venice. 
The other is a maritime route that builds on existing initiatives like the GMS to link up ports 
and coastal infrastructure from China’s Eastern seaboard through South Asia and Eastern 
Africa. It includes several regional loops that allow the ‘belt and the road’ to intersect and the 
official OBOR document stresses the importance of regulatory coherence in terms of 
connectivity, trade integration and logistical coordination. Moreover, the document highlights 
the complex regime that links OBOR initiatives to other regulatory programs such as the Asian 
Investment and Infrastructure Bank (AIIB). As the document notes, this includes efforts to 
build  
and expand the scope and scale of bilateral currency swap and settlement with other countries along the 
Belt and Road, open and develop the bond market in Asia, make joint efforts to establish the Asian 
Infrastructure Investment Bank and BRICS New Development Bank, conduct negotiations among 
related parties on establishing [a/the] Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) financing institution, 
and set up and put into operation the Silk Road Fund as early as possible (National Development and 
Reform Commission, 2015)  
The OBOR strategy attempts to develop a regulatory geography of logistics so that facilitates 
the transnationalisation of Chinese state capital. However, such logistics in the context of the 
OBOR are important not only in terms of connectivity but also as a means of exporting key 
conceptions of regulatory control, namely the centrality of SOEs in building this connectivity. 
Hence, as Ye (2015: 220) notes, the National Development and Reform Commission has listed 
‘investment, manufacturing, cross-border industrial parks, energy, trade and infrastructure 
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constructions as the “priority of priorities”’. Moreover, Chinese SOEs, such as China CITIC 
Bank, the Central Tourism Group and China Tea Exporters, have been important supporters of 
OBOR proposals, and Chinese industrial cities like Kunming and Chengdu have sought to 
position themselves as centres of communication and transportation from the coastal cities to 
Central Asia; and coastal cities such as Zhejiang and Jiangsu have been at the forefront of 
pushing forward the Silk Road proposals (Ye, 2015: 220). This suggests that as the OBOR 
develops, provincial governments and provincial capital may emerge as the key drivers of 
transnationalisation with significant consequences for neighbouring countries, as has been the 
case with the GMS. Take, for example, the impact of the transnationalisation of Chinese capital 
for Cambodia. The particular ways in which Chinese capital has been transnationalised in 
Cambodia has shaped the relationship between fractions of Cambodian capital – which are now 
linked to Chinese-led investment and accumulation strategies, particularly in the areas of 
infrastructure, land and garment manufacturing – and its internalisation within Cambodian state 
apparatus (Pal, 2014). Regarding garment manufacturing, for instance, the nature of Chinese 
investment has changed from being driven by the initiatives of individual companies to now 
taking the form of Chinese government-supported Special Economic Zones that are 
incorporated into the vertically integrated value-chain of textile and garment companies in 
China (Wang, Wu, and Yao, 2008). This shift is the result of ongoing processes of UCD and 
its contradictions in China and elsewhere. New contender states with lower wages, such as 
Cambodia, have begun to erode China's dominance in low-cost manufacturing. At the same 
time, the decline in manufacturing in the US and Europe, because of Chinese dominance, has 
resulted in the imposition of restrictions on direct Chinese imports. Through investment in 
Cambodia's garment manufacturing sector, Chinese manufacturers have could take advantage 
of lower wages in rising contender states while also bypassing American and European 
restrictions, which were attempts to protect US and European manufacturing from Chinese 
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competition (Wang, Wu, and Yao, 2008). Here we see that the transnationalisation of Chinese 
capital – and its associated conceptions of regulatory control – are articulated against liberal 
forms of capitalism through Cambodia’s incorporation into Chinese geoeconomic strategies.  
 
Conclusion  
This paper has outlined an approach that takes seriously the growing role that economics plays 
in states’ foreign policies. We have argued that the push by the US and China for new regional 
economic agreements like the TPP, RCEP and OBOR, needs to be understood as an outcome 
of global processes of uneven and combined development and the diverse new 
transnationalised state projects these processes have given rise to. Our Poultanzian-UCD 
approach, with its focus on the way diverse capitalist forms are internalised within the state, 
allows us to escape US-centric accounts of global capitalism and the ‘transnational state’.  
Rather, it is argued that regional trade and infrastructure agreements are best viewed as a 
particular type of geoeconomic strategy that we term ‘regulatory geographies’. This 
geoeconomic strategy aims to address capitalist contradictions in the US and China through 
the export of what we term, ‘conceptions of regulatory control’. 
 
Yet, because they favour certain class fractions over others and seek to affect change in other 
states’ institutional structures, regulatory geographies generate contestation both within and 
between states. This can be seen in the difficulties faced by the US and China in gaining 
domestic and international agreement for their proposals and in the apparent abandonment of 
the TPP by the Trump Administration. RCEP negotiating countries, like South Korea and 
Japan, who were also signatories to the TPP, have sought to introduce more stringent IPR 
provisions into the RCEP talks, while others, like India, have tried to use the negotiations to 
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push for migration reforms to allow the easier movement of workers (Haidar, 2016). These 
divergences from the Chinese agenda of trade and investment liberalisation reflect the nature 
of capitalist crises within these countries such as, for instance, India’s ‘jobless’ economic 
growth. The TPP negotiations were hindered by concerns in other signatory countries, such as 
Australia, about American IPR provisions and ISDS clauses (Pearce, 2015). Ultimately, 
however, it was domestic political opposition in the US, from groups unconvinced that 
Obama’s strategy of transnationalisation would benefit them, which led to its demise. The TPP 
generated opposition from an unlikely alliance of social forces including unionists, consumer 
groups, the Democratic base and Tea Party Republicans who feared that the deal would 
primarily benefit multinational corporations at the expense of American wages and jobs. A 
significant factor behind the election of Trump, who campaigned against the TPP, was the 
collapse of the Democratic voter base. This base had roots in the old industrial economy in the 
‘Rust Belt’ states in the mid-western and north-eastern states of the US that have suffered the 
most in the uneven and combined development of the American economy (Chacko and 
Jayasuriya, 2017). Trump’s apparent push for the revitalisation of American manufacturing is 
an attempt to undermine aspects of the US’s combined capitalist development, such as the 
reliance of American manufacturers on Asian supply chains, as a response to the political 
struggles generated by this pattern of uneven and combined development.  This would require 
government expenditure to build US supply chains, acquiescence from the interior bourgeoisie 
to produce more expensive consumer goods and resist automation, and a willingness by 
American consumers to pay more for products, all of which constitute a significant departure 
from the geoeconomic transnationalisation strategies that have thus far been dominant. 
 
While we have focused on the TPP, RCEP and OBOR, our framework has a much wider 
applicability than these regional projects. For example, the European Monetary Union project 
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can be seen as a way of transnationalising the so-called ‘German model of capitalism’ and 
bringing with it the structural incoherence that we now see in Southern Europe. In turn, these 
transnationalised state projects exerted differential pressures on ‘national’ varieties of 
capitalism in Europe’s peripheral regions.  In short, the origins of the crisis can be traced to the 
contradictions and tensions of Europe’s uneven capitalist development which have led to 
complex forms of layered combined development at the regional and national levels. These 
points underscore our argument about the crucial role of the state in mediating different 
processes of UCD. It is these forms of political management – which are internalised within 
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1 Although, as Anievas and Allinson (2010: 206) have pointed out, Lacher and Teschke’s 
‘many logics’ approach seems to be at odds with several problematic assumptions in their 
previous political Marxism-inspired work, such as an abstract model of equalising, globalising 
capitalism and a states system whose unevenness is the result of pre-capitalist legacies, which 
means that they fail to produce ‘a viable theoretical framework from which to explain 
contemporary patterns of capitalist geopolitical rivalry’. 
2 For a somewhat different notion of regulatory geographies see Dowdle (2013) who uses it to 
distinguish between regulatory spaces of the global North and South. 
3 In this context, our paper with its stress on the state capitalism and rising powers has much 
in common with the recent work of Stephen (2014) and Hameiri and Jones (2016).  However, 
we seek to develop a conceptual framework that theorises relationship between uneven and 
combined development and the transnationalisation of state projects. 
4 There has been a wide-ranging debate on the nature of capitalism in China and its relationship 
to the broader varieties of capitalism literature (McNally C. (2012). A consideration of this 
debate is beyond the brief of this paper but we note this literature misses how these distinctive 
forms of capitalism emerges from interlinkages between different forms of uneven and 
combined development.  
 
                                                 
